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 Carlton Baptiste petitions for review of a decision of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) ordering his 
removal as an alien convicted of:  (1) an “aggravated 
felony” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which is 
defined as, inter alia, a “crime of violence,” 18 U.S.C. § 16; 
and (2) two or more crimes involving moral turpitude 
(“CIMTs”) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
 Baptiste’s petition requires us to decide whether the 
definition of a “crime of violence” provided in 18 U.S.C. § 
16(b) is void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.  Section 16(b) and similarly worded 
statutes have come under attack in federal courts across the 
country after the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which invalidated the 
so-called “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal 
Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), as 
unconstitutionally vague.   
 Although we initially conclude that Baptiste’s New 
Jersey second-degree aggravated assault conviction was for 
a crime of violence pursuant to § 16(b), we are persuaded 
that the definition of a crime of violence in § 16(b) is 
unconstitutionally vague after Johnson.  We therefore 
invalidate § 16(b) and hold that Baptiste was not convicted 
of an aggravated felony.  However, we conclude that 
Baptiste is nonetheless removable because he was convicted 
of two or more CIMTs. 
 Accordingly, we will grant the petition in part as it 
relates to the BIA’s aggravated felony determination, deny 
the petition in part as it relates to the BIA’s CIMT 
determination, and remand the case to the BIA for further 
proceedings so that Baptiste may apply for any relief from 
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removal that was previously unavailable to him as an alien 
convicted of an aggravated felony. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY 
A. Factual Background 
 Petitioner Carlton Baptiste is a native of Trinidad and 
Tobago who was admitted to the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident in 1972.  On December 15, 1978, 
Baptiste was convicted of atrocious assault and battery 
pursuant to former N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:90-1 (West 1969) 
(the “1978 Conviction”).  There is no indication from the 
administrative record as to the facts underlying this 
conviction.  Baptiste was sentenced to a suspended twelve-
month term of imprisonment and placed on probation for 
one year. 
 Over thirty years later, on April 8, 2009, Baptiste 
was convicted of second-degree aggravated assault pursuant 
to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1b(1) (West 2005) (the “2009 
Conviction”). 1   That statute provides that “[a] person is 
guilty of aggravated assault if he . . . [a]ttempts to cause 
serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury 
purposely or knowingly or under circumstances manifesting 
extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly 
causes such injury.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1b(1) (West 
2005).  As with his earlier conviction, there is no indication 
                                              
 1  We use the term “second-degree aggravated 
assault” throughout this opinion to refer to the crime 
defined at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1b(1) (West 2005). 
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from the administrative record as to the facts underlying 
Baptiste’s 2009 Conviction.  There is also no indication 
from the administrative record as to whether Baptiste 
pleaded guilty to the attempt crime in the statute, or, if he 
pleaded guilty to the completed crime, to which mental state 
in the statute Baptiste pleaded guilty to possessing—
purpose, knowledge or recklessness.  See A.R. 334.  He was 
sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment. 
B. Procedural History 
 In June 2013, the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) instituted removal proceedings against Baptiste.  
DHS asserted that, based on his 2009 Conviction, Baptiste 
was removable as an alien convicted of a crime of violence 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16 and, therefore, an aggravated 
felony pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  DHS later 
asserted that Baptiste was also removable, based on both his 
1978 Conviction and his 2009 Conviction, as an alien 
convicted of “two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, 
not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct” 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  On October 8, 
2013, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) sustained both charges 
of removability.  Baptiste appealed the IJ’s determinations 
to the BIA. 
 The BIA agreed with the IJ’s determination that the 
2009 Conviction was for a crime of violence.  It reasoned 
that, in order to qualify as a crime of violence under § 16(b), 
“the nature of [a] crime . . . must be such that its 
commission ordinarily would present a risk that physical 
force would be used against the person . . . of another, 
irrespective of whether the risk develops or harm actually 
occurs.”  A.R. 4.  Accordingly, the BIA determined that 
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“the relevant question . . . is whether the offense (whatever 
its mens rea may be) is one that inherently involves a 
person acting in conscious disregard of the risk that, in the 
course of its commission, he may ‘use’ physical force 
against the person of another.”  A.R. 4.  Under these 
principles, the BIA concluded that: 
[A]n individual who undertakes to cause 
serious bodily injury to another under 
circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to human life necessarily 
disregards the substantial risk that in the 
course of committing that offense he will use 
physical force against another, either to effect 
the serious bodily injury that the statute 
requires or to overcome the victim’s 
resistance or both.   
A.R. 4−5. 
 The BIA also agreed with the IJ’s determination that 
the 2009 Conviction was for a CIMT.2  It examined the 
manner in which New Jersey courts have construed the 
recklessness crime in Baptiste’s statute of conviction and 
observed that: 
New Jersey courts hold that an individual acts 
under circumstances manifesting an extreme 
indifference to the value of human life if he acts 
                                              
 2 Baptiste did not contest before the BIA, and does 
not contest in his petition for review before this Court, the 
IJ’s conclusion that his 1978 Conviction was for a CIMT. 
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with conscious awareness of the fact that his 
conduct bears a substantial risk that he will kill 
another and he conducts himself with no regard 
to that risk. 
A.R. 5.  Based on that observation, the BIA concluded that 
“an individual cannot form the culpable mental state and 
commit the culpable acts required for conviction . . . 
without acting in a base, vile or depraved manner and 
without consciously disregarding a substantial risk that he 
will kill another.”  A.R. 6. 
 Accordingly, the BIA dismissed Baptiste’s appeal.  
Baptiste filed a timely petition for review with this Court on 
November 14, 2014. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The BIA had appellate jurisdiction over the IJ’s order 
of removal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).  We have 
jurisdiction over Baptiste’s petition for review of the BIA’s 
dismissal of his appeal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 
 “Where, as here, the BIA issues a written decision on 
the merits, we review its decision and not the decision of the 
IJ.”  Bautista v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 744 F.3d 54, 57 (3d 
Cir. 2014).  Because an assessment of whether a crime 
constitutes a crime of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
16(b) implicates the criminal provisions of the U.S. Code, 
we exercise de novo review over the BIA’s determination 
that the 2009 Conviction was for a crime of violence and, 
therefore, an aggravated felony.  Aguilar v. Att’y Gen. of the 
U.S., 663 F.3d 692, 695 (3d Cir. 2011).  Similarly, we 
review Baptiste’s due process challenge to the definition of 
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a crime of violence in § 16(b) de novo.  Abdulrahman v. 
Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 595−96 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 Since the BIA’s determination that the 2009 
Conviction was for a CIMT was made in an unpublished, 
non-precedential decision issued by a single BIA member, 
we do not accord that determination any deference, and it is 
“[a]t most . . . persuasive authority.”  Mahn v. Att’y Gen. of 
the U.S., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014).  We therefore 
review the BIA’s CIMT determination de novo as well.   
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Baptiste’s 2009 Conviction was for a “crime of 
violence” under § 16(b) 
 An alien who is convicted of an “aggravated felony” 
after his admission to the United States is removable 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  The term 
“aggravated felony” is defined as, inter alia, a “crime of 
violence (as defined in [18 U.S.C. § 16], but not including a 
purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment 
[is] at least one year.”3  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).  Thus, in 
order to determine whether Baptiste’s 2009 Conviction was 
for an aggravated felony, we must first examine the 
definition of a “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 16.  
Aguilar, 663 F.3d at 695.  After having “ascertain[ed] the 
                                              
 3 Baptiste does not dispute that his 2009 Conviction 
was for a crime for which the term of imprisonment is at 
least one year. 
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definition of a ‘crime of violence,’” we must then compare 
that definition to the statute of conviction to determine 
whether the applicable crime defined in the statute of 
conviction is categorically a crime of violence—an inquiry 
known as the “categorical approach.”  Id. 
1. Definition of a “crime of violence” 
 A “crime of violence” is defined, in relevant part, as 
an offense “that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a 
substantial risk that physical force against the person or 
property of another may be used in the course of 
committing the offense.”  18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (emphasis 
added). 4   That definition requires “specific intent to use 
force” or, in other words, “the intentional employment of . . 
. force, generally to obtain some end.”  Tran v. Gonzales, 
414 F.3d 464, 470−71 (3d Cir. 2005); see Leocal v. 
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004) (“‘[U]se’ requires active 
employment.” (emphasis added)).  Thus, a crime of 
violence under § 16(b) is one that involves a substantial risk 
that force will be “actively employ[ed]” “in the furtherance 
of the offense.”  Tran, 414 F.3d at 471. 
 Within this framework, we have distinguished 
between those types of recklessness crimes that may be 
                                              
 4  Section 16(a) alternatively defines a “crime of 
violence” as “an offense that has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 
the person or property of another.”  18 U.S.C. § 16(a).  
However, the BIA did not address this alternative statutory 
definition and so we similarly do not address it here.  See Li 
v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 400 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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considered crimes of violence under § 16(b) and those that 
may not be so considered.  On the one hand, we have held 
that “pure” recklessness crimes are generally not crimes of 
violence under § 16(b).  Aguilar, 663 F.3d at 697.  Pure 
recklessness exists when “the perpetrator runs ‘no risk of 
intentionally using force in committing his crime.’”  Id. at 
698 (quoting Tran, 414 F.3d at 465).  For example, reckless 
burning is not a crime of violence under § 16(b) because 
“the risk [is] that the fire started by the offender will spread 
and damage the property of another,” which “cannot be said 
to involve the intentional use of force.”  Tran, 414 F.3d at 
472.  Similarly, crimes that only “raise[] a substantial risk 
that accidental, not intentional, force [will] be used,” such 
as reckless vehicular homicide, are not crimes of violence 
under § 16(b).  Aguilar, 663 F.3d at 699.  “The idea of 
purposeful action, of actively employing a means to achieve 
an end, is an essential component of both ‘use’ and ‘intent,’ 
and is absent from the concept of ‘recklessness.’”  Tran, 
414 F.3d at 471.5 
                                              
 5 The Supreme Court recently addressed the concept 
of “using” force in the related context of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(9).  See Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 
(2016).  Section 922(g)(9) “prohibits any person convicted 
of a ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’ from 
possessing a firearm.”  Id. at 2276 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(9)).  The phrase “misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence” is defined “to include any misdemeanor 
committed against a domestic relation that necessarily 
involves the ‘use . . . of physical force.’”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 921(a)(33)(A)).  The question before the Court was 
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whether reckless assaults fell within that definition.  Id. at 
2278.  
 In answering that question in the affirmative, the 
Court observed that an actor who is reckless “with respect 
to the harmful consequences of his volitional conduct” can 
“use” force within the meaning of § 921(a)(33)(A).  Id. at 
2279.  To illustrate its point, the Court posited a 
hypothetical situation in which “a person throws a plate in 
anger against a wall near where his wife is standing.”  Id.  
“That hurl counts as a ‘use’ of force even if the husband did 
not know for certain (or have as an object), but only 
recognized a substantial risk, that a shard from the plate 
would ricochet and injure his wife.”  Id. 
 One need not stretch the imagination to see that 
applying the Court’s formulation in Voisine to the § 16(b) 
context might sweep into the provision’s ambit the pure 
recklessness and accidental force recklessness crimes 
described above.  Both reckless burning and reckless 
vehicular homicide involve volitional acts “undertaken with 
awareness of their substantial risk of causing injury.”  Id. 
 However, noting “differences in [the] contexts and 
purposes” of § 921(a)(33)(A) and § 16, the Court went out 
of its way to make clear that its decision in Voisine “does 
not resolve whether § 16 includes reckless behavior.”  Id. at 
2280 n.4.  Since we conclude Baptiste’s 2009 Conviction 
falls within our more-circumscribed interpretation of 
§ 16(b), we need not examine to what extent the reasoning 
of Voisine applies in the § 16(b) context to broaden our 
existing interpretation of the provision.  We leave that 
question for another day. 
12 
 
 However, in contrast to those types of recklessness 
crimes, we have recognized that some recklessness crimes 
“raise a substantial risk that the perpetrator will resort to 
intentional physical force in the course of committing the 
crime” and so are crimes of violence under § 16(b).  
Aguilar, 663 F.3d at 699.  In Aguilar v. Attorney General, 
we held that the Pennsylvania crime of reckless sexual 
assault is a crime of violence under § 16(b).  Id. at 700−02.  
Although a defendant may act with a reckless state of mind 
in committing the offense, we observed that the defendant’s 
actions create a “substantial risk . . . that . . . the offender 
will intentionally use force to overcome the victim’s natural 
resistance against participating in unwanted intercourse.”  
Id. at 702. 
2. The categorical approach 
 In determining whether Baptiste’s 2009 Conviction 
was for a crime of violence under the foregoing principles, 
we must use the “categorical approach” set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 
(1990).  The categorical approach is used in a variety of 
contexts to determine whether a criminal conviction meets 
the requirements of a federal statute triggering some form of 
sentencing or immigration consequence.  See Rojas v. Att’y 
Gen. of the U.S., 728 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2013) (en 
banc); see, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 703 F.3d 205, 209 
(3d Cir. 2012) (“serious drug offense” requirement in the 
ACCA triggering sentencing enhancement); Restrepo v. 
Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 617 F.3d 787, 791 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“sexual abuse of a minor” requirement in the INA 
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triggering removability).  Under this approach, we do not 
consider the facts underlying Baptiste’s conviction (i.e., the 
conduct giving rise to his conviction).  See Aguilar, 663 
F.3d at 695.  Instead, we “compare [the] federal definition 
[of a crime of violence] to the statute of conviction” itself to 
determine whether the applicable crime defined in the 
statute of conviction is categorically a crime of violence.  
Id. 
 The statute of conviction at issue here provides that 
“[a] person is guilty of aggravated assault if he . . . 
[a]ttempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or 
causes such injury purposely or knowingly or under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value 
of human life recklessly causes such injury.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:12-1b(1) (West 2005).  The parties agree that, since 
the administrative record does not reveal to which crime in 
the statute of conviction Baptiste pleaded guilty, we should 
look to the recklessness crime in the statute—recklessly 
causing serious bodily injury to another under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value 
of human life.  Thus, the question we must answer is 
whether recklessly causing serious bodily injury to another 
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 
value of human life is categorically a crime of violence 
under § 16(b). 
 However, the foregoing formulation begs the 
question:  what does it mean to say that a crime defined in a 
statute of conviction is categorically a crime of violence 
under § 16(b)?   
 Baptiste and the Attorney General advocate opposing 
approaches to this question.  Baptiste points us to our 
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decision in Aguilar, in which we observed without further 
exposition that only if the “least culpable conduct necessary 
to sustain conviction under [a] statute” constitutes a crime 
of violence can the applicable crime defined in the statute 
be deemed categorically a crime of violence under § 16(b).  
Aguilar, 663 F.3d at 695 (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Denis v. Att’y Gen. of the 
U.S., 633 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2011))..6  Baptiste argues 
that the least culpable conduct for which there is a 
possibility of conviction for reckless second-degree 
aggravated assault is drunk driving manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life and resulting in 
serious bodily injury to another.  See, e.g., State v. 
Kromphold, 744 A.2d 640, 646 (N.J. 2000); State v. 
Sweeney, No. 12-08-1429, 2015 WL 6442334, at *1–*2 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 26, 2015).  Thus, under 
Baptiste’s view, only if that least culpable conduct meets 
the definition of a crime of violence in § 16(b) can the 
recklessness crime in his statute of conviction be deemed 
categorically a crime of violence pursuant to § 16(b). 
 The Attorney General counters that we must instead 
look to the conduct associated with the “ordinary case” of 
reckless second-degree aggravated assault—not the least 
culpable conduct.  The ordinary case inquiry finds its roots 
                                              
 6 Although we have not had occasion to interpret the 
“least culpable conduct” language in the § 16(b) context, we 
have interpreted it in the CIMT context to mean that “the 
possibility of conviction for non-turpitudinous conduct, 
however remote, is sufficient to avoid removal.”  Jean-
Louis v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 582 F.3d 462, 471 (3d Cir. 
2009).   
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in the Supreme Court’s opinion in James v. United States, 
550 U.S. 192 (2007), which addressed the operation of the 
categorical approach in the related ACCA residual clause 
context.  In James, the Court examined whether a 
defendant’s conviction in Florida for attempted burglary fell 
within the ACCA residual clause definition of a “violent 
felony.”  The residual clause defines “violent felony” in 
relation to a list of enumerated offenses, such as burglary 
and extortion, as a crime that “otherwise involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The defendant 
argued that, under the categorical approach, all cases of 
attempted burglary under his statute of conviction had to 
present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another 
before attempted burglary could be deemed categorically a 
violent felony.  James, 550 U.S. at 207.   
 The Court concluded that the defendant’s argument 
“misapprehend[ed] Taylor’s categorical approach.”  Id. at 
208.  “[E]very conceivable factual offense covered by a 
statute” need not “necessarily present a serious potential 
risk of injury before the offense can be deemed a violent 
felony.”  Id.  Rather, the Court concluded that the “proper 
inquiry” under the categorical approach is “whether the 
conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense, in the 
ordinary case, presents a serious potential risk of injury to 
another.” 7   Id. (emphasis added); see United States v. 
Stinson, 592 F.3d 460, 466 (3d Cir. 2010). 
                                              
 7 This past year, the Supreme Court re-affirmed the 
applicability of the ordinary case inquiry from James to the 
categorical approach in the ACCA residual clause context.  
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.  However, it later held the 
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 Although James was decided several years before 
our opinion in Aguilar, we did not consider in Aguilar 
whether the James ordinary case inquiry from the ACCA 
residual clause context should displace the least culpable 
conduct inquiry in the § 16(b) context.8   However, since 
James, nearly all of our sister circuits have adopted the 
ordinary case inquiry in the § 16(b) context.  See United 
States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 722−23 (7th Cir. 2015); 
United States v. Keelan, 786 F.3d 865, 871 (11th Cir. 2015); 
United States v. Avila, 770 F.3d 1100, 1107 (4th Cir. 2014); 
United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2014); 
Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 
2013); United States v. Echeverria-Gomez, 627 F.3d 971, 
978 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Van Don Nguyen v. 
Holder, 571 F.3d 524, 530 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Sanchez-Garcia, 501 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 2007).  
Additionally, the BIA reached the same conclusion last 
                                                                                                  
residual clause unconstitutionally vague due, in part, to the 
indeterminacy of the required ordinary case inquiry.  Id. 
 8  Because Aguilar did not decide this question or 
address the Supreme Court’s precedent in James, we may 
decline to use Aguilar’s least culpable conduct inquiry if we 
determine that the ordinary case inquiry is the correct 
analytical approach.  See United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 
533, 542 (3d Cir. 2009).  Moreover, the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Johnson, in which it re-affirmed the 
applicability of the ordinary case inquiry, see supra note 7, 
constitutes an intervening Supreme Court decision, which is 
also a “sufficient basis” for us to reevaluate our precedent in 
Aguilar.  Leb. Farms Disposal, Inc. v. County. of Lebanon, 
538 F.3d 241, 249 n.16 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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year.  See In re Mario Francisco-Alonzo, 26 I. & N. Dec. 
594, 601 (B.I.A. 2015). 
 We are persuaded that the ordinary case inquiry is 
the correct analytical approach in the § 16(b) context.  
Section 16(b) requires courts to ask whether a crime “by its 
nature” presents a substantial risk of the use of force.  
Accordingly, in Leocal v. Ashcroft—the Supreme Court’s 
only § 16(b) case—the Court stated that § 16(b) “covers 
offenses that naturally involve a person acting in disregard 
of the risk that physical force might be used against another 
in committing an offense.”  543 U.S. at 10 (emphasis 
added).  As a matter of plain language, asking whether the 
least culpable conduct sufficient to support a conviction for 
a crime presents a certain risk is inconsistent with asking 
whether that crime “by its nature” or “naturally” presents 
that risk.  See Perez-Munoz v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 357, 364 
(5th Cir. 2007) (noting that every violation of a state 
criminal statute “need not be violent” for the crime “to be a 
crime of violence by its nature” (emphasis added)); United 
States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F.3d 1202, 1204 n.2 (10th Cir. 
2003) (“We do not take the phrase ‘by its nature’ as an 
invitation to search for exceptional cases.”). 
 By contrast to the least culpable conduct inquiry, the 
Supreme Court’s ordinary case inquiry is aligned with the 
“by its nature” inquiry that the text of § 16(b) requires.  
Asking whether the “ordinary case” of a crime presents a 
certain risk is the equivalent of asking whether that crime 
“by its nature” presents that same risk.  The Court’s 
description of the ordinary case inquiry as asking whether 
“an offense is of a type that, by its nature” presents a certain 
18 
 
risk9 demonstrates the equivalence of the two inquiries.10  
James, 550 U.S. at 209 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, we 
                                              
 9 Although the residual clause does not include the 
“by its nature” language in its text, it is clear from this 
statement that the Court has read the same “by its nature” 
requirement as exists in § 16(b) into the residual clause.  See 
Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 446—47 (6th Cir. 2016); 
Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d at 722. 
 10  We are mindful that the Supreme Court used a 
“least of the acts criminalized” inquiry when undertaking 
the categorical approach in Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 
1678, 1684−85 (2013).  See also Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. 
Ct. 1980, 1986 (2015).  This inquiry asks whether “a 
conviction of the state offense ‘necessarily involved . . . 
facts equating to [the] generic [federal offense],’” 
Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684 (alterations in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Shepard v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24 (2005)), and so we view it as 
synonymous with the least culpable conduct inquiry from 
Aguilar.  However, we conclude that this inquiry is not 
applicable in the § 16(b) context. 
 Moncrieffe involved a determination of whether a 
predicate crime met the definition of a specific federal 
generic offense—“illicit trafficking in a controlled 
substance,” id. at 1683; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).  Other 
specific federal generic offenses include a “theft offense,” 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), “burglary offense,” id., and 
“sexual abuse of a minor,” id. § 1101(a)(43)(A).  The 
specific federal generic offense analysis is different in kind 
from the analysis required by § 16(b). 
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adopt the ordinary case inquiry as part of the categorical 
approach in § 16(b) cases. 
3. Application of the categorical approach 
 Given our adoption of the ordinary case inquiry in 
the § 16(b) context, we now must determine how to 
ascertain the ordinary case of reckless second-degree 
aggravated assault.  The first step in making this 
determination is defining the term “ordinary.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines “ordinary” as “[o]ccuring in the regular 
course of events,” “normal,” and “usual.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1273 (10th ed. 2014).  Other circuits have 
defined the ordinary case in a way consistent with this 
definition.  See Rodriguez-Castellon, 733 F.3d at 854 
(looking to the “usual” violation of a statute); United States 
v. Sonnenberg, 628 F.3d 361, 366 (7th Cir. 2010) (looking 
                                                                                                  
 A specific federal generic offense provision requires 
a court to determine whether a predicate crime is, for 
example, a “theft offense.”  By contrast, § 16(b) requires a 
court to determine whether a predicate crime, by its nature, 
poses a certain risk.  This linguistic distinction explains why 
the least of the acts criminalized inquiry is appropriate for 
specific federal generic offense cases, but the ordinary case 
inquiry is appropriate for § 16(b) cases.  See Rodriguez-
Castellon, 733 F.3d at 861 (“[A] court considering whether 
a state statute meets the definition of ‘sexual abuse of a 
minor’ must consider cases ‘at the margins of the statute,’ 
but a court performing an analysis of ‘substantial risk’ 
under § 16(b) may not do so.” (quoting Delgado-Hernandez 
v. Holder, 697 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2012))); In re 
Mario Francisco-Alonzo, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 599−600. 
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to the “typical case”); Van Don Nguyen, 571 F.3d at 530 
(looking to “the mainstream of prosecutions brought under 
the statute”); see also Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 40 
n.4 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (defining the ordinary 
case of a crime as the “most common form” of that crime).  
Therefore, in ascertaining the ordinary case of reckless 
second-degree aggravated assault, we will look to the 
conduct associated with the normal or usual commission of 
the crime. 
 There is little guidance as to how we should go about 
identifying that conduct.  See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.  
Indeed, during oral argument, neither advocate was able to 
articulate the ordinary case of reckless second-degree 
aggravated assault.  “How does one go about deciding what 
kind of conduct the ‘ordinary case’ of a crime involves?  ‘A 
statistical analysis of the state reporter?  A survey?  Expert 
evidence?  Google?  Gut instinct?’”  Id. (quoting United 
States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc)).  Although we ultimately conclude that the 
indeterminate nature of the ordinary case inquiry 
contributes to § 16(b)’s unconstitutionality, we must first 
undertake the analysis as best we can to determine whether 
Baptiste’s 2009 Conviction was for a crime of violence.  
See Egolf v. Witmer, 526 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We 
have a longstanding practice of 
avoiding constitutional questions in cases where we can 
reach a decision upon other grounds.”). 
 In the absence of any empirical analysis of 
convictions for reckless second-degree aggravated assault, 
we are limited to examining New Jersey case law to 
determine what conduct is associated with the ordinary case 
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of the crime.  Our review of case law is complicated in this 
case because the statute of conviction at issue includes 
several crimes (an attempt crime and a completed crime 
phrased with several disjunctive mental states) and the 
conviction documents of defendants prosecuted under the 
statute often do not specify which crime in the statute the 
defendant was convicted of committing.  See United States 
v. Garcia-Jimenez, 807 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2015); 
see, e.g., State v. Watkins, No. 12-02-0369, 2015 WL 
9694386, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 4, 2016) 
(verdict sheet for second-degree aggravated assault did not 
differentiate mental states).  This lack of specificity makes it 
impossible in many cases to determine whether a defendant 
was convicted of the crime at issue in this case—reckless 
second-degree aggravated assault—or the other crimes 
specified in the statute.11 
 However, based on our review of pertinent case law, 
we observe that there is a wide array of conduct for which a 
defendant can be convicted for reckless second-degree 
aggravated assault.  For purposes of our analysis, we group 
this conduct into three categories:  (1) conduct that itself 
constitutes an intentional use of force; (2) conduct that 
presents a substantial risk of the intentional use of force; 
and (3) conduct that presents no risk of the intentional use 
of force. 
                                              
 11 Given the dearth of New Jersey cases that make 
clear a defendant was convicted of the recklessness crime in 
the statute, we are forced to depart from our typical practice 
and cite to unpublished New Jersey opinions. 
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a) Intentional use of force 
 A defendant can be convicted for reckless second-
degree aggravated assault if he intentionally uses force 
against a victim and is reckless as to whether that force will 
cause “serious bodily injury.”  See State v. Jaramillo, No. 
04-01-0140, 2008 WL 3890655, at *11 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. Aug. 25, 2008) (per curiam) (noting that a jury 
was entitled to find the defendant guilty of reckless second-
degree aggravated assault for punching the victim); State v. 
Battle, 507 A.2d 297, 299 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) 
(observing that a thief’s forceful snatching of a victim’s 
purse, which leads to her serious bodily injury, could 
constitute reckless second-degree aggravated assault).  A 
recent case from the New Jersey courts addressing the 
closely-related crime of reckless third-degree aggravated 
assault12 is illustrative. 
                                              
 12 We use the term “third-degree aggravated assault” 
here to refer to the crime defined at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-
1b(7) (West 2005).  Reckless third-degree aggravated 
assault is in all material respects identical to reckless 
second-degree aggravated assault with the exception that 
reckless third-degree aggravated assault results in 
“significant bodily injury” as opposed to “serious bodily 
injury.”  Compare N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1b(7) (West 
2005) with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1b(1) (West 2005). 
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 In State v. Steffen, No. 09-11-2753, 2012 WL 
3155553, at *1−*2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 6, 2012) 
(per curiam), the defendant was convicted of reckless third-
degree aggravated assault after using a “choke slam” to 
subdue the victim.  As a result of the choke slam, the victim 
suffered a hematoma and temporary loss of sight.  Id. at *2.  
The trial court determined that the defendant had “acted 
‘recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life,’” id. at *1, and the 
reviewing court affirmed the trial court’s verdict, id. at *2. 
 Such conduct, which involved choke slamming the 
victim, itself involves the intentional use of force and so 
clearly meets the requirements of § 16(b).13  See Jimenez-
                                              
 13 In addition, there are examples of second-degree 
aggravated assault convictions in New Jersey for conduct 
clearly involving the intentional use of force for which it is 
unclear with what mental state the defendant was convicted 
of acting.  As we alluded to above, in such cases, the 
defendant pleads guilty, or the judge or jury returns a 
verdict of guilty, to the general offense of causing serious 
bodily injury purposely or knowingly or recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value 
of human life.  See, e.g., Watkins, 2015 WL 9694386, at *1–
*2 (defendant kicked an elderly man and was convicted 
without designation of mental state); State v. Fowlkes, No. 
05-09-1271, 2010 WL 86412, at *1–*3 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. Jan. 12, 2010) (per curiam) (defendant punched 
victim and hit victim with a broom and was convicted 
without designation of mental state). 
 It stands to reason that some of these convictions, 
which involve the intentional use of force and do not 
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Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(examining cases holding that recklessness crimes are 
crimes of violence under § 16(b) as involving 
“intentional conduct exhibiting a reckless disregard to the 
likelihood of injury”); Blake v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 152, 161 
n.6 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding a crime to be a crime of violence 
under § 16(b) where, under one theory of violation, “the 
perpetrator intends the conduct, and . . . recklessness is 
the mens rea with respect to the likelihood of physical 
harm” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
b) Substantial risk of intentional use of force 
 A defendant can also be convicted for conduct that, 
while itself not constituting an intentional use of force, 
presents a substantial risk that he will intentionally use 
force.  For example, in State v. Colon, 689 A.2d 1359, 
1361−62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), the defendant’s 
friend was being battered by a group of men outside a bar.  
The bar’s bouncer testified that he had grabbed hold of one 
of the men and was pulling him off of the defendant’s friend 
when that man was shot.  Id. at 1361.  The jury found that 
the defendant had shot the victim, but acquitted him of 
purposeful or knowing aggravated assault; instead, it 
convicted him only of reckless second-degree aggravated 
assault.  Id. at 1362 n.3, 1364.  Although several theories of 
the crime could have supported the jury’s verdict, relevant 
                                                                                                  
designate a mental state, are based on a reckless mental 
state whereby the defendant, as in Steffen, intentionally used 
force but was reckless as to the possibility of serious bodily 
injury. 
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for our purposes is the court’s comment that the verdict 
could have been the result of a jury finding that the 
defendant “recklessly fired [his] weapon.”  Id. at 1364. 
 As we explained above, we determined in Aguilar 
that a reckless sexual assault is a crime of violence because 
there is a substantial risk that the defendant will encounter 
resistance from the victim and then decide to intentionally 
use force to “overcome” the victim.  See Aguilar, 663 F.3d 
at 701−02.  Similarly, in Colon, once the defendant 
recklessly fired his weapon and hit the victim, there was a 
substantial risk that the victim would fight back and that the 
defendant would then decide to intentionally fire his 
weapon (i.e., intentionally use force against the victim).  
Although not a certainty, the reckless firing of the weapon 
created a substantial risk of that result, which is all that § 
16(b) requires.14 
                                              
 14  Although this analysis considers conduct and 
events taking place after the recklessness crime has 
technically been completed, it is consistent with our prior 
interpretations of the “in course of committing the offense” 
language in § 16(b).  See 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (defining a 
crime of violence as “a felony . . . that, by its nature, 
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the 
person or property of another may be used in the course of 
committing the offense” (emphasis added)). 
 For example, we observed in Aguilar, in dicta, that 
burglary is a crime of violence under § 16(b).  Aguilar, 663 
F.3d at 698; see Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10 (observing that 
burglary is the “classic example” of a crime of violence 
under § 16(b)).  The crime of burglary—breaking and 
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entering a dwelling at night to commit a felony—is 
technically complete as soon as the defendant has entered 
the dwelling.  However, we observed that burglary is a 
crime of violence under § 16(b) because “burglary creates a 
substantial risk that the burglar will have to use physical 
force to overcome the desire of home occupants to protect 
themselves and their property.”  Aguilar, 663 F.3d at 701.  
This risk only materializes after the defendant has entered 
the dwelling and thus after the crime of burglary has been 
completed.  See id. (identifying the risk of the use of force 
as being “created by an unlawful entry into a victim’s 
home”); Henry v. Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 
493 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he requisite elements 
of a burglary are complete once the burglar enters and 
possesses the necessary mental intent.  However, the 
substantial risk that the burglar will use force comes from 
the possibility that the burglar will encounter another during 
the course of the burglary; it is irrelevant that the technical 
elements have already been accomplished.”); cf. Johnson, 
135 S. Ct. at 2557 (“[A] risk of injury arises . . . because the 
burglar might confront a resident in the home after breaking 
and entering.”). 
 Similarly, we observed in Ng v. Attorney General 
that the use of interstate commerce facilities in the 
commission of a murder-for-hire is a crime of violence 
under § 16(b).  Ng v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 436 F.3d 392, 
397 (3d Cir. 2006).  That crime is technically complete after 
mere solicitation to commit a murder-for-hire and so 
“proscribes conduct that may never pose a risk of violence.”  
Id.  Yet we observed that it is a crime of violence under 
§ 16(b) because, even if “some violations . . . will never 
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c)  No risk of intentional use of force 
 Finally, a defendant can be convicted for conduct 
that presents no risk that he will intentionally use force.  
Specifically, in accordance with Baptiste’s suggested least 
culpable conduct, a defendant can be convicted for reckless 
second-degree aggravated assault for drunk driving 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life 
and resulting in serious bodily injury to another.  See, e.g., 
Kromphold, 744 A.2d at 646; Sweeney, 2015 WL 6442334, 
at *1–*2.  Common to such drunk driving cases is that the 
defendant did not intend to cause harm to the victim and so 
is not “actively employ[ing]” force in committing the crime.  
Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9; see Oyebanji v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 
260, 264 (3d Cir. 2005).  Moreover, such conduct does not 
present a “risk that the reckless[] offender will step in and 
commit an intentional act of violence.”  Tran, 414 F.3d at 
472−73. 
* * * 
 Our task is to determine, based on the foregoing 
review of case law, what conduct is associated with the 
                                                                                                  
culminate in . . . the commission of a murder[,] . . . the 
natural consequence of [the commission of the crime] is that 
physical force will be used upon another.”  Id.  But cf. 
United States v. Hull, 456 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(“[M]ere possession of a pipe bomb holds no risk of 
the intentional use of force. . . . [T]he relevant inquiry is not 
whether possession makes it more likely that a violent crime 
will be committed, but instead whether there is a risk that in 
committing the offense of possession, force will be used.”). 
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ordinary case of reckless second-degree aggravated assault.  
Unsurprisingly, the Attorney General urges us to focus on 
conduct in the first two categories and Baptiste urges us to 
focus on conduct in the third category.  In the absence of 
any concrete guidance as to how to make this determination, 
see Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557−58, we must rely on our 
common sense and judicial experience, see Sonnenberg, 
628 F.3d at 366; Rodriguez-Castellon, 733 F.3d at 856.   
 We recognize that it is impossible in this case to 
determine with precision what specific conduct is associated 
with the ordinary case of the crime.  The crime at issue in 
this case covers a wide array of conduct—more than, say, 
burglary.  A defendant can be convicted of the crime for 
conduct as dissimilar as an intentional act of physical 
violence (first category of conduct) and drunk driving 
causing accidental injury (third category of conduct).  With 
a crime that covers such a wide array of conduct, we begin 
with the common sense proposition that the conduct 
associated with the ordinary case of a conviction 
presumptively lies at or near the middle of the culpability 
spectrum15—here, the second category of conduct we have 
identified. 
                                              
 15  We use the term “culpability spectrum” here to 
refer to conduct that, on one end of the spectrum, presents 
no risk of the intentional use of force (third category of 
conduct) and, on the other end of the spectrum, involves an 
intentional use of force (first category of conduct). 
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 Baptiste’s single factual scenario to the contrary in 
which there is no risk of the intentional use of force—a 
drunk driver—is not enough to overcome this presumption.  
We have seen nothing in our foregoing review of case law 
that persuades us that the normal or usual commission of the 
crime involves the actions of a drunk driver (third category 
of conduct).  Rather, we view such conduct as being 
associated with a narrow subset of convictions and thus 
insufficient to render the crime categorically not a crime of 
violence under the ordinary case inquiry.  Cf. Van Don 
Nguyen, 571 F.3d at 530 (“[A]n unsubstantiated risk of 
physical force in some small subset of cases is [in]sufficient 
to classify [an] offense as a ‘crime of violence.’”).  We 
reach the same conclusion with respect to the first category 
of conduct we have identified.   
 We therefore conclude that the conduct associated 
with the ordinary case of reckless second-degree aggravated 
assault lies somewhere within the second category of 
conduct we have identified, which falls within the definition 
of a crime of violence in § 16(b).16  See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2558 (referring to the ordinary case as a “judge-imagined 
                                              
 16 If this conclusion is unsatisfying, it is the result of 
the indeterminacy of the ordinary case inquiry, which 
requires us to determine what conduct is associated with the 
normal conviction of the crime despite the broad swath of 
disparate conduct it covers.  See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2559 
(“How does common sense help a federal court discern 
where the ‘ordinary case’ of vehicular flight in Indiana lies 
along th[e] spectrum [of culpable conduct]?”).  We address 
this indeterminacy in the next section.  See infra section 
III.B. 
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abstraction”).  Because we conclude that reckless second-
degree aggravated assault does, in the ordinary case, present 
a substantial risk of the intentional use of force, reckless 
second-degree aggravated assault in New Jersey is 
categorically a crime of violence pursuant to § 16(b). 
 Given our conclusion that Baptiste was convicted of 
a crime of violence pursuant to § 16(b), we now turn to the 
constitutional question presented in this case—is § 16(b) 
void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment? 
B. Section 16(b) is void for vagueness under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
 The Due Process Clause precludes the government 
from taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property under 
a statute “so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair 
notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it 
invites arbitrary enforcement.”  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556.  
Baptiste argues that his 2009 Conviction was not for an 
aggravated felony because the incorporated definition of a 
crime of violence in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally 
vague. 17   Baptiste bases his argument on the Supreme 
                                              
 17  The Attorney General wisely does not contest 
Baptiste’s assertion that he has a right under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause to bring a void for 
vagueness challenge to the definition of a crime of violence 
in § 16(b).  See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 
(1951) (considering whether the phrase “crime involving 
moral turpitude” was void for vagueness due to the “grave 
nature of deportation”); Golicov v. Lynch, --- F.3d ----, No. 
16-9530, 2016 WL 4988012, at *2−*3 (10th Cir. Sept. 19, 
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Court’s recent decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. 
Ct. 2551 (2015), which invalidated the residual clause of the 
ACCA. 
 The ACCA provides for a sentence enhancement for 
certain defendants who have three or more prior convictions 
for a “violent felony.”  Id. at 2555.  The Act defines 
“violent felony” as, inter alia, a crime that is “burglary, 
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise 
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) 
(emphasis added).  The emphasized language is known as 
the “residual clause.”  As we explained above, prior to 
Johnson’s holding that the residual clause is 
unconstitutionally vague, courts assessing whether a crime 
fell within the residual clause were required to use the same 
                                                                                                  
2016); Shuti, 828 F.3d at 446 (“[B]ecause deportation strips 
a non-citizen of his rights, statutes that impose this penalty 
are subject to vagueness challenges under the Fifth 
Amendment.”); Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1112−14 
& n.4 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, --- S. Ct. ----, No. 15-
1498, 2016 WL 3232911 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2016) (concluding 
that an alien “may bring a void for vagueness challenge to 
the definition of a ‘crime of violence’ in the INA” and 
collecting cases from other circuits permitting similar 
challenges).  “It is well established that the Fifth 
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in 
deportation proceedings.”  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 
523 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)); see, e.g., Denis, 
633 F.3d at 218−19 (entertaining an alien’s procedural due 
process challenge). 
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categorical approach that courts use in the § 16(b) context.  
See supra section III.A.2.  Thus, in “[d]eciding whether the 
residual clause covers a crime,” a court had to “picture the 
kind of conduct that the crime involves in ‘the ordinary 
case,’ and . . . judge whether that abstraction presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury.”  Johnson, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2557 (quoting James, 550 U.S. at 208). 
 The majority in Johnson observed that two features 
of the residual clause “conspire[d] to make it 
unconstitutionally vague”—the ordinary case inquiry and 
the serious potential risk inquiry.  Id. at 2557−58.  First, the 
majority observed that there are many different conceptions 
of what the ordinary case of a crime involves.  Id.  For 
example, “does the ordinary instance of witness tampering 
involve offering a witness a bribe?  Or threatening a witness 
with violence?”  Id. at 2557.  The majority concluded that 
“[t]he residual clause offers no reliable way to choose 
between . . . competing accounts of what [an] ‘ordinary’ 
[case] involves.”  Id. at 2558.  Second, the majority 
observed that the clause left “uncertainty about how much 
risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.”  Id.  
Thus, the majority concluded that the combination of 
“indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a 
crime with indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for 
the crime to qualify as a violent felony . . . produces more 
unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process 
Clause tolerates.”  Id.   
 After reaching this conclusion, the majority 
examined the residual clause precedents of both the 
Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals and determined 
that “repeated failures to craft a principled and objective 
standard out of the residual clause confirm its hopeless 
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indeterminacy.”  Id.  It then addressed several arguments 
penned by the dissent.  First, it rejected as inconsistent with 
the Court’s precedents the dissent’s view that “a statute is 
void for vagueness only if it is vague in all its applications.”  
Id. at 2561.  Second, the majority dismissed the dissent’s 
concern that the invalidation of the residual clause for 
vagueness would cast constitutional doubt over laws similar 
to the residual clause that use terms such as “substantial 
risk.”  Id.  The majority reasoned that such laws do not link 
the phrase “substantial risk” to a “confusing list of 
examples,” and, “[m]ore importantly . . . require gauging 
the riskiness of conduct in which an individual defendant 
engages on a particular occasion.”  Id.  Finally, the 
majority rejected the dissent’s invitation to abandon the 
ordinary case inquiry and interpret the residual clause to 
“refer to the risk posed by the particular conduct in which 
the defendant engaged.”  Id. at 2561−62. 
 In addressing whether Johnson compels the 
invalidation of § 16(b), we do not write on a blank slate.  
The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have 
considered the question and concluded that Johnson does 
render § 16(b) void for vagueness.  See Shuti v. Lynch, 828 
F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 
F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2015); Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, --- S. Ct. ----, No. 15-1498, 
2016 WL 3232911 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2016); Golicov v. Lynch, 
--- F.3d ----, No. 16-9530, 2016 WL 4988012 (10th Cir. 
Sept. 19, 2016).  By contrast, the en banc Fifth Circuit has 
concluded that § 16(b) is not unconstitutionally vague after 
Johnson, and the Second and Eighth Circuits have 
concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), which contains 
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nearly identical language to § 16(b), 18  survives Johnson.  
See United States v. Prickett, --- F.3d ----, No. 15-3486, 
2016 WL 5799691 (8th Cir. Oct. 5, 2016); United States v. 
Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc); 
United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2016).  We 
enter the fray with the benefit of these considered opinions 
on § 16(b)’s constitutionality. 
 The two features of the residual clause that the 
Supreme Court concluded “conspire[d] to make [the 
residual clause] unconstitutionally vague” were the ordinary 
case inquiry and the serious potential risk inquiry.  Johnson, 
135 S. Ct. at 2557−58; see United States v. Calabretta, 831 
F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 2016).  Given that the ordinary case 
inquiry, as used in the § 16(b) context, is derived from the 
residual clause context, we can be certain that the ordinary 
case inquiry is identical in both contexts.  As we described 
above, in the § 16(b) context, a court must ask “whether the 
conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense, in the 
ordinary case, presents a [substantial risk of the intentional 
use of force].”  James, 550 U.S. at 208 (emphasis added).  
                                              
 18 Before the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Shuti holding 
§ 16(b) to be vague, a panel of the Sixth Circuit had 
concluded that § 924(c)(3)(B) was not unconstitutionally 
vague after Johnson.  See United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 
340 (6th Cir. 2016).  However, in Shuti, the Sixth Circuit 
distinguished Taylor, noting that “[u]nlike the ACCA and 
INA, which require a categorical approach to stale predicate 
convictions, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is a criminal offense that 
requires an ultimate determination of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt—by a jury in the same proceeding.”  
Shuti, 828 F.3d at 449. 
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Because § 16(b) “offers no reliable way to choose between . 
. . competing accounts of what” that “judge-imagined 
abstraction” of the crime involves, Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 
2558, the ordinary case inquiry is as indeterminate in the § 
16(b) context as it was in the residual clause context.  See 
Golicov, 2016 WL 4988012, at *6; Shuti, 828 F.3d at 447; 
Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d at 722−23; Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 
1115−16. 
 This conclusion holds true for the second feature of 
each statute as well—the risk inquiry.  Whereas the residual 
clause asks how much risk it takes for a crime to present a 
“serious potential risk” of physical injury, § 16(b) asks how 
much risk it takes for a crime to present a “substantial risk” 
of the intentional use of force.  The phrases have two 
linguistic differences:  § 16(b) replaces the residual clause’s 
“serious” with the word “substantial” and replaces the 
residual clause’s “potential risk” with “risk.”   
 A “serious risk” is equally as vague as a “substantial 
risk.”  See Golicov, 2016 WL 4988012, at *6.  To be sure, a 
“potential risk” encompasses more conduct than a simple 
“risk.”  See James, 550 U.S. at 207−08 (“[T]he combination 
of the two terms suggests that Congress intended to 
encompass possibilities even more contingent or remote 
than a simple ‘risk.’”).  However, in our view, this minor 
linguistic distinction is insufficient to bring § 16(b) outside 
of the reasoning of Johnson.  See Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d at 
722; Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1116 n.9.  The critical feature of 
the “serious potential risk” inquiry that rendered it 
indeterminate in Johnson was not that the risk was 
“potential,” but that the residual clause required the use of a 
vague “serious risk” inquiry.  The majority confirmed as 
much when, in response to the dissent’s suggestion that the 
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majority opinion would cast constitutional doubt on statutes 
using a “substantial risk” inquiry, it did not draw any 
vagueness distinction between the phrases based on the 
word “potential.”  See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561. 
 The Attorney General directs our attention to an 
additional linguistic distinction between the statutes that she 
views as meaningful.  She argues that the scope of crimes 
that present a substantial risk of the use of force is narrower 
than the scope of crimes that presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury.  See Prickett, 2016 WL 5799691, at 
*2; Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d at 676; Hill, 832 F.3d at 
148.  This is so because there is undoubtedly a class of 
conduct that presents a risk that a victim will be injured 
without presenting a risk that force will intentionally be 
used against that victim.  See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10 n.7 
(noting that § 16(b) “plainly does not encompass all 
offenses which create a ‘substantial risk’ that injury will 
result from a person’s conduct”).  One example of such 
conduct is arson with intent to destroy a building, which 
runs the risk of a victim being injured without any risk of 
the arsonist using intentional force against that victim.  The 
Attorney General argues that the § 16(b) inquiry therefore 
“falls short of the wide-ranging thought experiment 
previously required by the [residual clause].”  Resp’t Br. 44 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Doe, 145 F. Supp. 3d 167, 182 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)). 
 While the Attorney General is correct that fewer 
crimes fall within § 16(b) than within the residual clause, 
we do not view the scope of crimes covered by each 
provision as integral to the vagueness analysis.  The 
Attorney General cannot point us to any language in 
Johnson that suggests otherwise because the Court’s 
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vagueness holding in Johnson was focused on the “serious 
potential risk” inquiry required by the residual clause.  See 
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558 (“[T]he residual clause leaves 
uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to 
qualify as a violent felony.  It is one thing to apply an 
imprecise ‘serious potential risk’ standard to real-world 
facts; it is quite another to apply it to a judge-imagined 
abstraction.” (emphasis added)); Welch v. United States, 
136 S. Ct. 1257, 1262 (2016) (“The residual clause failed 
not because it adopted a ‘serious potential risk’ standard but 
because applying that standard under the categorical 
approach required courts to assess the hypothetical risk 
posed by an abstract generic version of the offense.” 
(emphasis added)).  As such, we focus here in our 
vagueness analysis on the “substantial risk” inquiry required 
by § 16(b).   
 In applying those indeterminate risk inquiries, 
whether fewer or more cases fall within each respective 
statutory provision because of the modifiers “physical 
injury” and “use of force” does not affect the indeterminacy 
of the “serious potential risk” or “substantial risk” inquiries 
themselves.  See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1272 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (observing that the residual clause was held to 
be vague because it requires courts to “judge whether [the 
ordinary case of a crime] presents a serious potential risk of 
some result” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  In short, the distinction the Attorney General 
draws between the two statutes is a distinction without a 
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difference within the reasoning of Johnson.19  See Shuti, 828 
F.3d at 448. 
                                              
 19 The Fifth Circuit in Gonzalez-Longoria identified 
another linguistic distinction between the residual clause 
and the language of § 16(b), which contributed to its 
conclusion that § 16(b) is not unconstitutionally vague.  It 
pointed to the requirement in § 16(b) “that the risk of 
physical force arise ‘in the course of committing’ the 
offense” and observed that the § 16(b) inquiry is narrower 
than the residual clause inquiry because it “does not allow 
courts to consider conduct or events occurring after the 
crime is complete.”  Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d at 676 
(emphasis added). 
 However, as we explained supra note 14, we have 
not always interpreted § 16(b) in such a restrictive manner 
as we have sometimes considered conduct occurring after 
the offense has technically been completed in our 
substantial risk inquiry.  See, e.g., Henry, 493 F.3d at 310; 
see also Taylor, 814 F.3d at 396 (White, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he cases demonstrate that 
the phrase ‘in the course of committing the offense’ has not 
consistently been interpreted to exclude consideration of the 
risk of force after the offense has technically been 
completed.”); Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1118 (observing that the 
Ninth Circuit has similarly not interpreted § 16(b) in such a 
restrictive manner). 
 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s observation that 
burglary is the “classic example,” of a crime of violence 
within the meaning of § 16(b), Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10, 
suggests that it similarly does not so restrictively interpret 
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 The Attorney General next asserts that § 16(b) does 
not fall within the reasoning in Johnson because, “unlike the 
list of exemplar crimes preceding the residual clause, . . . 
§ 16(b) . . . do[es] not rely [on] a unique list of enumerated 
crimes to complicate the assessment of risk.”20  Resp’t Br. 
46; 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining “violent felony” 
as a crime that is “burglary, arson, or extortion, involves 
use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
                                                                                                  
the “in the course of committing the offense” language in § 
16(b).  See Henry, 493 F.3d at 310.  As the Court explained 
in Johnson, “[t]he act of . . . breaking and entering into 
someone’s home does not, in and of itself, normally cause 
physical injury.  Rather, risk of injury arises . . . because the 
burglar might confront a resident in the home after breaking 
and entering.”  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. 
 20  Section 4B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines 
previously contained a residual clause defining a “crime of 
violence” that was both identically worded to the residual 
clause in the ACCA and preceded by a list of exemplar 
crimes.  Accordingly, we recently held the residual clause 
that was in § 4B1.2 to be void for vagueness after Johnson.  
See Calabretta, 831 F.3d at 137.  In invalidating that 
residual clause, we noted that “we need not consider — and 
so leave for another day — whether a similar residual clause 
without an exemplary list of offenses would be subject to 
the same degree of due process concern that the Supreme 
Court identified in Johnson.”  Id. at 137 n.9.  Today is that 
day.  As we explain herein, we find § 16(b), which does not 
contain an exemplary list of offenses, to be 
unconstitutionally vague. 
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another” (emphasis added)); see Prickett, 2016 WL 
5799691, at *2; Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d at 677; Hill, 
832 F.3d at 146.  It is true that the majority in Johnson 
commented on the confusion engendered by the list of 
exemplar crimes preceding the residual clause.  See 
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558, 2561.  In responding to the 
dissent’s argument that holding the residual clause 
unconstitutional would place numerous provisions of 
federal and state law that use terms like “substantial risk” in 
constitutional doubt, the majority retorted: 
Almost none of the cited laws links a phrase 
such as “substantial risk” to a confusing list of 
examples.  “The phrase ‘shades of red,’ 
standing alone, does not generate confusion or 
unpredictability; but the phrase ‘fire-engine red, 
light pink, maroon, navy blue, or colors that 
otherwise involve shades of red’ assuredly does 
so.”   
Id. at 2561 (quoting James, 550 U.S. at 230 n.7 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)).   
 However, in the very next sentence of the opinion, in 
response to the dissent’s same argument, the majority 
stated: 
More importantly, almost all of the cited laws 
require gauging the riskiness of conduct in 
which an individual defendant engages on a 
particular occasion.  As a general matter, we do 
not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call 
for the application of a qualitative standard such 
as “substantial risk” to real-world conduct; “the 
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law is full of instances where a man’s fate 
depends on his estimating rightly . . . some 
matter of degree[.]”   The residual clause, 
however, requires application of the “serious 
potential risk” standard to an idealized ordinary 
case of the crime. 
Id. (first alteration in original) (first emphasis added) 
(internal citation omitted) (quoting Nash v. United States, 
229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913)); see Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1262.  
 We read Johnson to mean that the confusing list of 
examples preceding the residual clause only added to the 
residual clause’s already-existing vagueness.  Indeed, the 
language in Johnson by no means suggests that the list of 
examples was an integral component of the Court’s finding 
that the residual clause was unconstitutionally vague.  See 
Golicov, 2016 WL 4988012, at *7; Shuti, 828 F.3d at 448; 
Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1117−18.  Rather, as the Supreme 
Court made clear, the vagueness was the product of “[t]wo 
features of the residual clause”—the ordinary case inquiry 
and the risk inquiry—which, as we explained above, are 
present in the § 16(b) analysis as well.21  Johnson, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2557; see Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d at 722−23. 
                                              
 21 The Supreme Court’s discussion in Johnson about 
its “repeated failures to craft a principled and objective 
standard out of the residual clause” does not change our 
analysis.  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558.  The Court’s 
difficulty in interpreting the residual clause on multiple 
occasions merely provided further “evidence of vagueness,” 
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558, that the Court had already 
found in the provision as a result of the “[t]wo features of 
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 In fact, the lack of examples in § 16(b) introduces at 
least as much vagueness into the provision as the presence 
of confusing examples introduced into the residual clause.  
See Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1118 n.13.  “The specific offenses 
[preceding the residual clause] provide [a] baseline from 
which to measure whether other similar conduct ‘otherwise 
. . . presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.’”  
James, 550 U.S. at 203 (third alteration in original).  This 
baseline “provide[s] at least some guidance as to the sort of 
offenses Congress intended for the [residual clause] to 
cover.”  Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1118 n.13.  Such guidance is 
absent from § 16(b), which contains no example offenses.  
As a result, courts are left to undertake the § 16(b) analysis 
guided by nothing more than other judicial decisions that 
can lay no better claim to making sense of the 
indeterminacy of the analysis in a principled way than we 
have today.  See supra section III.A.3. 
                                                                                                  
the residual clause [that] conspire[d] to make it 
unconstitutionally vague,” id. at 2557.  Thus, that difficulty 
only served to “confirm [the residual clause’s] hopeless 
indeterminacy.”  Id. at 2558 (emphasis added); see Welch, 
136 S. Ct. at 1261−62 (distinguishing between the Court’s 
difficulty in interpreting the residual clause and its 
vagueness analysis); Shuti, 828 F.3d at 450; Vivas-Ceja, 
808 F.3d at 723.  Moreover, the fact that the Supreme Court 
has only taken and decided one § 16(b) case, see Leocal, 
543 U.S. at 1, and so has not experienced repeated failures 
in interpreting the provision, is probative only of the Court’s 
composition of its docket—not absence of vagueness in the 
provision.  See Shuti, 828 F.3d at 450; Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 
1119. 
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* * * 
 Seemingly lost in these nuanced arguments about the 
scope and import of Johnson is the fact that the Supreme 
Court expressly anticipated the effect its holding would 
have on statutes with the language contained in § 16(b).  In 
addressing the applicability of its holding to those statutes, 
the Court stated:  “As a general matter, we do not doubt the 
constitutionality of laws that call for the application of a 
qualitative standard such as ‘substantial risk’ to real-world 
conduct.”  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561 (emphasis added); 
see Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1262.  Section 16(b) is not such a 
law.  Rather, § 16(b) calls for the exact analysis that the 
Court implied was unconstitutionally vague—the 
application of the “substantial risk” inquiry to the “idealized 
ordinary case” of a crime.  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561 
(emphasis added).   
 Thus, because the two inquiries under the residual 
clause that the Supreme Court found to be indeterminate—
the ordinary case inquiry and the serious potential risk 
inquiry—are materially the same as the inquiries under 
§ 16(b), § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.  See Golicov, 
2016 WL 4988012, at *6; Shuti, 828 F.3d at 441; Vivas-
Ceja, 808 F.3d at 722−23; Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1120.  “By 
combining indeterminacy about how to measure the risk 
posed by a crime with indeterminacy about how much risk 
it takes for the crime to qualify as” a crime of violence, 
§ 16(b) “produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness 
than the Due Process Clause tolerates.”  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2558.   
 Because § 16(b) is invalid, Baptiste’s 2009 
Conviction was not for an aggravated felony pursuant to 8 
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U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  However, since Baptiste does 
not contest that his 1978 Conviction was for a CIMT, he is 
still removable if his 2009 Conviction was for a CIMT.  We 
now turn to that question. 
C. Baptiste’s 2009 Conviction was for a CIMT 
 An alien who is convicted of “two or more crimes 
involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme 
of criminal misconduct” after his admission to the United 
States is removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  Baptiste argues that the BIA erred in 
concluding that his 2009 Conviction was for a CIMT.  In 
determining whether that conviction was for a CIMT, we 
must again follow the categorical approach.  Mehboob v. 
Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 549 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 2008).  As 
with our crime of violence determination, the parties agree 
that, in undertaking the categorical approach, we should 
look to the recklessness crime in the statute of conviction.  
Thus, the question we must answer is whether recklessly 
causing serious bodily injury to another under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value 
of human life is categorically a CIMT. 
 In the CIMT context, our cases make clear that “we 
look to the elements of the statutory offense to ascertain the 
least culpable conduct hypothetically necessary to sustain a 
conviction under the statute.”  Mahn, 767 F.3d at 174 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jean-Louis, 582 
F.3d at 471).  Thus, the “possibility of conviction for non-
turpitudinous conduct, however remote, is sufficient to 
avoid removal.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 471).  Under these 
dictates, if there is any non-turpitudinous conduct that could 
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sustain a conviction for reckless second-degree aggravated 
assault, then that crime is categorically not a CIMT.  
 We have in the past defined morally turpitudinous 
conduct as “inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to 
the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed other 
persons.”  Hernandez-Cruz v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 764 
F.3d 281, 284 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 89 (3d 
Cir. 2004)).  Such conduct can “inhere in serious crimes 
committed recklessly, i.e., with a conscious disregard of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that serious injury or death 
would follow.”  Partyka v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 417 F.3d 
408, 414 (3d Cir. 2005).  Specifically, a recklessness crime 
can constitute a CIMT “if certain statutory aggravating 
factors are present.”  Knapik, 384 F.3d at 90; see Idy v. 
Holder, 674 F.3d 111, 118−19 (1st Cir. 2012) (recklessness 
coupled with “serious bodily injury” aggravating factor). 
 In Knapik, the BIA concluded that first-degree 
reckless endangerment under New York law was a CIMT.  
384 F.3d at 93.  New York law provided that a “person is 
guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, 
under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to 
human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates 
a grave risk of death to another person.”  Id. at 89 (quoting 
N.Y. Penal Law § 120.25 (McKinney 2009)).  We 
concluded that the BIA had acted reasonably in concluding 
that the New York crime constituted a CIMT.  Id. at 90. 
 In so concluding, we observed that the New York 
statute at issue defined a recklessness crime that 
“contain[ed] aggravating factors, requiring that a defendant 
create a ‘grave risk of death to another person’ ‘under 
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circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human 
life.’”  Id.  We went on to observe that “the BIA could 
reasonably conclude that the elements of depravity, 
recklessness and grave risk of death, when considered 
together, implicate accepted rules of morality and the duties 
owed to society.”  Id.  Although the recklessness crime 
defined in the statute of conviction in this case uses 
nominally different wording, it is in all material respects the 
same as the New York crime in Knapik that we found the 
BIA reasonably classified as morally turpitudinous. 
 First, both crimes are recklessness crimes and the 
mental state of recklessness is virtually identical under New 
York and New Jersey law.  In New York, “[a] person acts 
recklessly . . . when he is aware of and consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that is “of 
such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a 
reasonable person would observe in the situation.”  N.Y. 
Penal Law § 15.05(3) (McKinney 2009).  In New Jersey, 
“[a] person acts recklessly . . . when he consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that is “of 
such a nature and degree that . . . its disregard involves a 
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a 
reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-2b(3) (West 2005). 
 Second, the aggravating factors in both crimes are 
virtually identical.  As to the first aggravating factor, the 
New York crime required that the defendant act “under 
circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human 
life,” N.Y. Penal Law § 120.25 (McKinney 2009), whereas 
the New Jersey crime at issue here requires that the 
defendant act “under circumstances manifesting extreme 
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indifference to the value of human life,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2C:12-1b(1) (West 2005).  There is no meaningful 
difference between those two phrases. 
 As to the second aggravating factor, the New York 
crime required that the defendant engage in conduct that 
“creates a grave risk of death to another person.”  N.Y. 
Penal Law § 120.25 (McKinney 2009).  Similarly, the New 
Jersey crime at issue here requires conduct that results in 
“serious bodily injury.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1b(1) 
(West 2005).  And the New Jersey courts have required that 
the defendant be aware that “his conduct [bears] a 
substantial risk that he will kill or seriously injure” others.  
Colon, 689 A.2d at 1364 (alteration in original).  This risk 
must be so great that it constitutes a “probability as opposed 
to the mere possibility of serious bodily injury.”  State v. 
Pigueiras, 781 A.2d 1086, 1096 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001); see Mahn, 767 F.3d at 175 (concluding 
Pennsylvania’s reckless endangerment crime is not a CIMT 
because it “only requires conduct that may put a person in 
danger”).  Again, the aggravating factor in each crime is 
materially the same. 
 Thus, the New Jersey crime of reckless second-
degree aggravated assault, which requires recklessly causing 
serious bodily injury to another under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, 
falls squarely within our opinion in Knapik as a recklessness 
crime with two aggravating factors.  Reckless second-
degree aggravated assault is a CIMT.22 
                                              
 22 In arguing for a contrary result, Baptiste points us 
to reported convictions for reckless second-degree 
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Because Baptiste’s 2009 Conviction was for a CIMT,23 the 
BIA correctly determined that, together with his 1978 
                                                                                                  
aggravated assault for drunk driving and cites our statement 
in Knapik that “drunk driving . . . almost certainly does not 
involve moral turpitude.”  Knapik, 384 F.3d at 90.  
However, we were careful in Knapik not to foreclose the 
possibility that some egregious forms of drunk driving 
could involve moral turpitude.  We were merely referring in 
that case to a “simple DUI offense,” id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting In re Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
1188, 1194 (B.I.A. 1999)), and not drunk driving as 
prosecuted under the statute at issue here, which results in 
serious bodily injury to another person and evinces extreme 
indifference to the value of human life.  Such egregious 
conduct is undoubtedly turpitudinous. 
 Baptiste also argues that our decision in Partyka 
compels the conclusion that his 2009 Conviction was not 
for a CIMT.  However, in Partyka, we concluded that 
negligently assaulting a law enforcement officer was not a 
CIMT so the holding in that case is not applicable to the 
more culpable recklessness crime at issue here.  Partyka, 
417 F.3d at 416.  Moreover, we expressly stated in Partyka 
that, if the petitioner was convicted of recklessly assaulting 
a law enforcement officer, we would agree with the BIA’s 
conclusion that the crime involved moral turpitude.  Id. 
 23  Our holding today is limited to the New Jersey 
crime of reckless second-degree aggravated assault, which 
requires recklessly causing serious bodily injury to another 
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 
value of human life.  We express no opinion on whether an 
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Conviction, Baptiste is removable as an alien convicted of 
two or more CIMTs pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the petition 
in part as it relates to the BIA’s aggravated felony 
determination, deny the petition in part as it relates to the 
BIA’s CIMT determination, and remand the case to the BIA 
for further proceedings. 
                                                                                                  
assault crime involving “ordinary” recklessness would 
constitute a CIMT. 
 
